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Abstract. This essay argues that Antony and Cleopatra’s pitting of Egypt against Rome 
is a cipher of aesthetic resistance to modern rationality. The coordinates are Ador-
nian. Antony’s and Cleopatra’s complex identities elude the disenchanting, nominal-
ist machinery in which diffuse indeterminacy necessitates conceptual imposition. 
Here, the individuals are essentially dramatized: sensate, embodied selves composed 
and expressed in relations of passionate recognition. The lovers’ deaths, and especially 
Cleopatra’s self-conscious theatre, rewrite the ascetic, dominative, and pseudo-theatri-
cal rationality of Octavian Rome. The protest, the passion and singularity, lives mainly 
through its expressive emphases – such as hyperbole – and the re-functioning of the 
very dominative roles and norms being opposed. This reflects the restricted but critical 
– aesthetic – status of early modern drama, and specifies its opposition to the deepen-
ing attack on sensate knowing in its world.
Keywords. Shakespeare, Adorno, aesthetics, modernity, nominalism.
1. Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra envisions a life redeemed 
from domination1. Recent work by Hugh Grady (2013) and William 
Junker (2015) has affirmed Cleopatra’s faltering but finally clear-eyed 
opposition to Octavius Caesar’s eternalist idea of sovereignty and 
spectacle. The argument that follows pushes further towards estab-
lishing the aesthetic import of this opposition and the drama that 
brings it forth. Theodor Adorno’s work offers pointers, but the play 
is no illustration of any pre-form philosophy. Resistance to such a 
fate is key to its aesthetic character2.
1 Shakespeare (1606). References are given by act, scene, and line numbers 
in the text.
2 Adorno develops no reading of Shakespeare, but there are many local 
comments. For his relation to Hamlet, see Oppitz-Trotman (2016). On Shake-
speare and this tradition in aesthetics, see Grady (2009). For reservations 
about its application to «pre-autonomous» art, cf. Hammermeister ([2002]: 
210).
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This lens shows how Antony and Cleopatra 
expresses some problematic aspects of 
«modernity»3. Aesthetics resists some defining 
rationalizing procedures and the stifled social 
experience that is their correlate. It attends to two 
areas of damage: the human body and its sen-
sate, material world. Both have been evacuated of 
authority and meaningfulness. Aesthetics pushes 
back on both fronts, opposing or problematiz-
ing the identifying concept and physical or moral 
law, as well as the separation of ethical and objec-
tive domains (Bernstein [1992]). Just what is early 
modern about Shakespeare’s world in these terms 
is, no doubt, controversial terrain. The full para-
phernalia of modern reason, perhaps most criti-
cally economistic «rationality» and commodifi-
cation, is clearly not yet pervasive at this time. 
Nevertheless, some fateful stress-points, such as 
abstraction and self-mastery, are apparent, as will 
be argued here4.
Antony and Cleopatra’s pitting of Rome against 
Egypt has long been elaborated and complicated 
in the criticism. Its significance is layered with 
various world-historical themes and allusions in 
the play, as heroism yields to procedure, republic 
to empire – and Christianity is anticipated («The 
time of universal peace is near», Octavius pro-
claims, with historical irony [4.6.5])5. In the fol-
lowing, the tensions between Roman norms and 
3 The concept of «modernity» is vexed – as to its 
content, chronological application, and normative-cum-
descriptive character. This is its interest, and no over-
all definition is assumed here. The analysis behind this 
essay’s approach to modern rationality is Horkheimer 
and Adorno (1944), who find disenchantment in pre-
historical myth, a myth to which contemporary rea-
son reverts. They argue, of course, for more reason, not 
less. Likewise, this essay defends the «critical, utopian» 
elements of the modern aesthetic, against modernity 
(Grady [2013]: 173-174). 
4 On the larger ascetic and conceptual problematic, 
see Weber (1905) and Gauchet (1985). For the increased, 
proto-economistic, severity of the distinction of gift from 
exchange, interest from disinterest, in early modern cul-
ture, and the resistance offered by an early modern devo-
tional poet, see Mapp (2013).
5 Cf. 1 Thessalonians 5.3.
the experiences associated with Cleopatra and 
Egypt are considered anew, from the standpoint 
of the aesthetic resistance to domination outlined 
above. Cleopatra seems destined for stuffing and 
mounting in Caesar’s imperial display-case, as 
law and measure master beauty and sublimity, the 
sensate body, the expansive individual. Yet she, 
and the play, refuses this banishment to cognitive 
and political vacancy. When she sets her theatre 
against Octavius’ version, the stakes, I suggest, are 
those of disenchanted modernity. 
The larger view implied here sees the religious 
controversies of Shakespeare’s age as centrally 
involved in rationalizing, so-called «secularizing», 
currents6. In particular, the developments have an 
anti-expressive logic that Shakespeare everywhere 
explores, if indirectly. Briskly put, reformed reli-
gion underlines the believer’s faith at the expense 
of works, which are no longer seen as efficacious 
in salvation. Salvation is not to be earned in any 
way; for God is utterly free, and faith itself is his 
gift. This fundamental human concern is thus 
removed from, and only riskily traceable in, 
worldly appearances and actions. This tenet, and 
problem, is one ingredient in the developing pri-
ority of intentions over consequences in legal 
and moral reasoning, and in separating law from 
context and the agent from whatever is made of 
what he or she does. Equally, the larger opera-
tions of God’s radical, unpredictable freedom are 
hard to discern. Yet it is imperative to try. Hence 
the persistence in the period of rival Providential 
interpretations of the historical and natural world 
alongside increasingly disenchanted explorations7.
6 For accounts complicating linear, progressive, and 
linked ideas of secularization and individual autonomy, 
see Cummings (2013), Gillespie (2009), Taylor (2007). 
On Weber’s narrative and concept of «disenchantment», 
see Das and Davis (2017) and Crawford (2017). Mapp 
(2021) develops many of these themes in detail.
7 On Providence, see Walsham (1999); on natural sci-
ence, Funkenstein (1986) and Gaukroger (2006). These 
developments also feed into the spread and development 
of scepticism, philosophical and vernacular, that reaches 
an apogee in Descartes’s radical, «methodological» doubt. 
The classic text on Shakespeare’s proleptic relationship 
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In this culture, «idolatry» becomes a master-
term of abuse, the key to the charge of «supersti-
tion». The charge bespeaks a critical suspicion: 
that spiritual import and agency have been wrong-
ly ascribed to activities or objects, such as Catholic 
rituals or imagery. It alleges subjective projection 
and material fixation8. This attitude is of course 
central to Puritan objections to the early modern 
playhouse itself as a nest of sinful sensory allure-
ments (Pollard [2004]). And not just places or 
artefacts or rituals, but one’s affective and idea-
tional life are all open to such iconoclastic «cri-
tique». The rationale is crucial in determining the 
modern ideas of matter and sensation. Purged of 
cognitive authority, they become data for abstract 
conceptual subsumption. «Idoloclasm» is thus 
a fateful feature of the conceptual set-up that 
the artwork, in aesthetic perspective, questions 
through its emphasis on the medium and sensate 
experience.
Asceticism is vital to the suspicious project 
of extirpating attachments to sensory objects and 
somatic interests, all which are increasingly de-
authorized (see McGrath [2020]). Weber helps 
identify the ambivalence of this affirmation of the 
individual, which seems both autonomous and 
pathologically unclear to itself, always needing to 
check that its justifications have been picked clean 
of distortive motivation (Weber [1905]: 104). Self-
denial cannot save your soul, but the subjection of 
one’s entire existence to rational organization and 
its worldly rewards gives the best hope, overall, 
of being able to infer that one actually does enjoy 
God’s blessing (Weber [1905]: 79). This is the self-
dominative angle, the questionable secularization, 
and the pervasive suspicion, that Adorno’s analy-
ses draw on and develop, and which are already at 
work in the early modern period. 
Antony and Cleopatra both indexes and resists 
these developments in its culture. Central in what 
with Cartesian scepticism is Cavell (2003); see also Ham-
lin (2005). Popkin (2003) relates the larger theological 
and philosophical development of scepticism.
8 The centrality of this topic to modern critique, and 
especially ideas of ideology, is examined in Jarvis (2001).
follows are the play’s representations of ascetic and 
passionate life and the views taken of Antony’s 
perilous involvement with Cleopatra’s «magic» 
(3.10.18) – and the role in this of the «rational-
izing» concept that would dominate the lovers. 
The analysis traces what is «antitheatrical» in such 
domination, in its assault on appearances, expres-
sion, consequence, on affective and intersubjective 
recognition.
Issues of singularity and identity are the spe-
cific focus here, with the topic of nominalism 
framing the reading. In Antony and Cleopatra, 
passionate experiences of singularity fascinate and 
disturb Roman rational norms. Antony is caught 
between a legislated identity and what is from 
Roman perspective a reprehensible excess (1.1.2). 
He nonetheless comes to promise an alternative 
norm. Cleopatra provokes singular identifica-
tions and is a sort of aesthetic riddle: eros united 
with knowing and ethical life. Most important is 
Cleopatra’s dream of Antony after he is gone. She 
affirms «an Antony» (5.2.98): a new concept and 
value, not just a named person. This possibility, 
she insists, is no dream.
Antony and Cleopatra thus adumbrates a pro-
test against imperial «peace». It does so largely 
negatively, through complex repetitions and explo-
rations of the conditions under which the lovers 
must live. This protest also enciphers the predica-
ment – and critical opportunities – of early mod-
ern theatre itself.
2. Theodor Adorno refers to «Shakespeare’s 
nominalistic breakthrough into mortal and infi-
nitely rich individuality» ([1970a]: 317; [1970b]: 
213). «Nominalistic» means that characters do 
not instantiate concepts, do not participate in, 
nor fully yield up their secrets to, any given, 
moralized rational structures, in their world 
or ours. Genre norms and even the concept of 
character come under pressure. This is because 
concepts themselves are just names, not cosmic 
infrastructure.
Hans Blumenberg describes nominalism’s 
theological birth and its role in modern develop-
ments. It is a corollary of God’s omnipotence:
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[God’s power] renders meaningless the interpretation 
of the individual as the repetition of the universal. […] 
But these very riches of creative abundance put human 
reason in the embarrassing position of having to set 
its economy of classificatory concepts over against the 
authentic reality as an auxiliary construct that is just 
as indispensable as it is inappropriate – in the posi-
tion, that is, of being unable from the very beginning to 
interpret its theoretical mastery of reality as anything 
but self-assertion. (Blumenberg [1966]: 153)
God is not constrained by the «rational» 
demands of creation, nor ever tied by promises 
or past actions. What he commands is good, just 
because he commands it (Pfau [2013]: 161-162). 
Concepts are our labels, not parts of God’s mind. 
So human freedom is also fundamentally recon-
ceived, for individuals do not participate in any 
universal or final end. The roles and hierarchies 
of classical rationalism are jettisoned in favour 
of universal equality in individuation, while the 
emphasis on free willing protects the conscience 
from the obligations of law (Siedentop [2015]: 
306-320)9.
The impenetrably remote God leaves us 
exposed to an unbuffered death. Adorno men-
tions «mortal» riches in the phrase cited. With the 
privileging of the individual comes an obliterat-
ing death – the «absolute price of absolute value», 
as Adorno argues in Minima Moralia (Adorno 
[1951]: 231). There, Adorno offers a contrast with 
his contemporary «total» society in which death 
is meaningless, because individuals are meaning-
less as individuals. They are abstract workers and 
consumers, infinitely replaceable, playing out the 
demonic reduction of living singularity to speci-
men. Antony and Cleopatra protests such a fate. It 
mourns and affirms the individual against catego-
ries that are really rationalizing imposition. Just 
so, it refuses to boil down to a morality play of the 
great man lost to excess but instead transforms 
that schema.
Yet the play also sees how individuality must 
be neither autarchic nor vanishingly nominalist. 
9 My understanding has also been informed by 
Gillespie (2009) and Taylor (2007).
It must bear, and be borne up in, recognitive rela-
tions, both institutional and passionate. Antony 
asserts that he and Cleopatra are «peerless», 
and he requires the world to acknowledge it, too 
(1.1.41-42). The binding of uniqueness to recogni-
tion (and efforts to command it) is made repeat-
edly evident in the play through the exertions of 
characters trying to get the protagonists’ measure.
Antony attracts hyperbole. He is Cleopatra’s 
«man of men» (1.5.74); akin to «plated Mars» 
(1.1.4) for Philo; while Agrippa thinks «A rarer 
spirit never / Did steer humanity» (5.1.31-32). 
Cleopatra is missing her lover, while Philo talks of 
the former soldier he claims is now lost in «dot-
age» when the play starts (1.1.1); Agrippa’s obitu-
ary remark might be politeness. Context matters, 
and the play is obviously interested in assess-
ing forms of hyperbole. So what of the elaborate, 
superhuman Antony, who towers up in Cleopatra’s 
report of her dream, a Colossus «whose legs 
bestrid the ocean» (5.2.81)? Antony’s critics see in 
him a cautionary tale of extremes, «the triple pillar 
of the world transformed / Into a strumpet’s fool» 
(1.1.12-13). Cleopatra, on the other hand, finds 
her lover’s worth in a kind of amplification of his 
statuary magnificence, perhaps its transfiguration. 
But what are the elements of Antony that she must 
transform?
The idea that Antony is not living up to the 
standard of his own example recurs over and over. 
Philo again: «sometimes when he is not Antony/ 
He comes too short of that great property / Which 
still should go with  Antony» (1.1.59-61)10. When 
he falls short, he is not himself. «Antony» is a 
norm – a common noun with fixed content – and 
an essential name, Antony’s true identity.
When Antony fights Octavius, the fight is also 
within. His shameful defeat is read as self-attack: 
«Experience, manhood, honour, ne’er before / Did 
violate so itself», Scarus proclaims (3.10.22-23; cf. 
25-28). Antony concurs: «I have fled myself […] 
My very hairs do mutiny […] Friends, begone. 
10 Cf. Cleopatra: «Antony / Will be himself» (1.1.44-
45); Enobarbus: «I shall entreat him to answer like him-
self» (2.2.3-4).
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[…] Let that be left / Which leaves itself» (3.11.7-
20). He has fled himself, his body turns on itself, 
and his followers must depart. Identity disin-
tegrates with, even as, the human bonds it has 
sustained and depended on. All defining traits 
disperse: «He’s unqualitied with very shame» 
(3.11.43). He is no longer a self at all. Antony’s 
identity is performative in the punishing sense 
that it is constantly defined in terms of an exter-
nal criterion. In this theatre, actors must fulfil the 
script, not interpret or revise it. Antony’s perfor-
mance vitiates his identity, this role; he is defined 
by his dereliction, self-deletion. Antony thus rep-
resents an acute tension between personifying a 
norm and being a person enmeshed in a narrative 
(cf. Crawford [2017]: 19ff.).
Yet self-mastery is a Roman norm, a pre-
requisite and justification of political command. 
Caesar admiringly apostrophizes the old Antony 
for his hardihood on campaign (1.4.62-64)11. 
Antony, we learn, has lived off horses’ «stale» (63) 
and worse. He conceded the barest minimum to 
nature, and nothing to predilection. His foul sus-
tenance is almost an emblem: contempt for appe-
tite. «And all this», Caesar adds, «was borne so 
like a soldier that thy cheek / So much as lanked 
not» (1.4.69-72). In picture-book moralism, forti-
tude has a becoming aspect, and the lesson is total 
self-sufficiency.
Antony’s faults must therefore be both physi-
cal blemishes and disempowering liabilities. After 
Actium, Octavius instructs Thidias to «Observe 
how Antony becomes his flaw, / And what thou 
thinkst his very action speaks / In every pow-
er that moves» (3.12.34-36). He wants details of 
how Antony is taking his disgrace. William Jun-
ker has shown how Caesar’s invitations to people 
to see for themselves actually stipulate what will 
be seen ([2015]: 174-176). Similarly, Octavius 
11 Modernity’s «inner worldly asceticism» has 
famously been emphasized by Weber ([1905]: 82). The 
illegibility and inalterability of the divine decision as to 
one’s salvation issue in new demands for worldly suc-
cess, from whose instrumentally rationalized form one’s 
blessed status might be inferred. McGrath (2020) strongly 
reasserts the theme.
defines the lesson here: Antony’s lack of self-com-
mand will manifest in his minutest movements. 
Honour is command and self-command. This all 
reflects Octavius’ larger political theatre, which is 
utterly anti-theatrical. Meaning is not constituted 
through its unfolding and the surprise of expecta-
tions, intentions or rules; what appears is simply 
the roll-out of the pre-established programme. Yet 
of course this example can only be declared in the 
wake of Antony’s military defeat, which is what 
gives Octavius’ moralism a free hand. Indeed, 
to be taken as any such edifying personification, 
whether ascetic paragon or ruined sybarite, and 
thus a punctual unity of essence and appearance, 
doing and being, is to be power’s specimen. Stoic 
withdrawal and self-possession, in this light, and 
despite the values asserted, look like compensation 
or solace for necessary defeat by a world, a pow-
er, beyond the self ’s etiolated domain (cf. Grady 
[2013]: 175-176).
The self-control is allegedly rational. Enobar-
bus judges that Antony has made «his will / Lord 
of his reason» (3.13.3-4). His brainless optimism 
ruins effective manhood: «A diminution in our 
captain’s brain / Restores his heart. When valour 
preys on reason, / It eats the sword it fights with» 
(3.13.202-204). Yet these absurd moments when 
the stricken Antony proposes single combat with 
Octavius (3.13.25-28) are ones where the truth of 
rational self-command emerges: it is an unheroic 
mode enabled by military force, and it is ludicrous 
in its absence (see Dollimore [1984]: 206-217).
Here is a man viewed as at war with himself, 
and one who thinks, at points, that he is run-
ning away from what he truly is. His indulgences 
entail self-loss, emasculation, utter defeat, even 
the crumbling of his mind and body. Yet Antony 
affirms, through his death and beyond conscious-
ness of his shame, something worth it. The image 
of Antony as strewn across his disintegrating body 
and fleeing retainers even gives way to a more 
positive sense of participation – or at least a con-
viction of its possibility.
The play inhabits and dramatizes some Roman 
fixities to multidimensional effect. Take Antony’s 
association with Hercules and Mars. The names 
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appear in the play tangled in their traditions of 
interpretation (Adelman [1973]). The Hercu-
lean references are particularly variegated. Her-
cules stands for masculine prowess, but he is also 
reduced to cross-dressing with Omphale and to 
a madness in which he slaughters his family. He 
represents self-attack but also triumphs over the 
Underworld and is taken up to heaven. In the 
Renaissance, he is the virtuous man who makes 
the difficult choice; as the serpent killer, and as 
man and god, he is an archetype of Christ (Bull 
[2005]: 86-140). The strange scene (4.3) in which 
Hercules is heard departing Antony’s camp is 
thus highly overdetermined. It seems to signify 
Antony’s loss of Roman manhood or of his men’s 
faith. Or perhaps we witness the Christian oust-
ing of pagan gods (cf. 3.11.58-60) 12. But maybe all 
allegorical schemata are ditched, and if Herculean 
heroism is gone, so are the moralizing ancillaries.
The allusions, then, show a protagonist inter-
preting the mythic name, rather than vice versa. 
Conventions are expressed, as Walter Benjamin 
puts it, rather than expression conventionalized 
([1925]: 184-185). This is not a drama deploying 
familiar codes for universal identification and edi-
fication. 
The astonishing images in which Antony’s fall 
is conceived are another challenge to the didac-
tic notion of defaced statuary. Feeling betrayed by 
Cleopatra, Antony boils: «The shirt of Nessus is 
upon me. Teach me, / Alcides, thou mine ances-
tor, thy rage. / Let me […] with those hands that 
grasped the heaviest club / Subdue my worthiest 
self» (4.12.43-47). His hands are and are not those 
of Hercules. And it is his «worthiest self» that is 
to be quelled. David Bevington glosses the phrase: 
«that part of his noble nature that has striven for 
glory» (Shakespeare [1606]: 228). This self proves 
its worth by refusing to live in ignominy. The sub-
duing returns him to coherence, «the worthiest» is 
confirmed, and Antony will have no facet that is 
not Roman, although he will be dead. Yet obvious-
ly the facets are barely his own. Alienation inheres 
12 Hercules declares disbelief in gods in Ovid’s Meta-
morphoses, IX, 203-204.
in the formulations, and the Herculean scene 
denotes madness.
A little later, Antony feels that without power 
and betrayed by love, he is dissolving. He «cannot 
hold this visible shape» (4.14.17) and, cloud-like, 
will morph into something else by and by: «That 
which is now a horse, even with a thought / The 
rack dislimns and makes it indistinct / As water 
is in water» (4.14.9-11). There is no self-conflict 
because there is barely a self. This is not a nomi-
nalist fantasy of limitless self-invention but an 
annihilated state where there is nothing to com-
pensate for or justify the losses. But it is not quite 
a state of nothingness.
Mardian’s false report that Cleopatra has killed 
herself includes the comment that «her fortunes 
mingled / With [his] entirely» (4.14.24-25). The 
lexicon of indistinction now represents a self-
expanded, rather than limited, by the claim of 
another. His grievous loss restores Antony’s love. 
Self-interference must end: «Now all labour / Mars 
what it does» (4.14.47-48). This is a new under-
standing of his conflict: no action in this world 
can realize his deepest interests. The renunciation 
reflects the desire to re-join his lover: «I will be / 
A bridegroom in my death and run into’t / As to 
a lover’s bed» (4.14.99-101). This is the identity 
towards which all has led, its «final cause». Note 
the reason he gives Eros to kill him: «Do it at 
once, / Or thy precedent services are all / But acci-
dents unpurposed» (4.14.82-84). Only this con-
clusion will give coherence to all his, their, prior 
actions.
Antony botches his suicide, fittingly. And 
it is hard not to feel these complications in his 
last scene with Cleopatra, despite appearanc-
es. Antony re-packages his suicide now he has 
learned that Cleopatra is not dead. Dying, he 
reassures her: «Peace! / Not Caesar’s valour hath 
o’erthrown Antony, / But Antony’s hath triumphed 
on itself» (4.15.14-16). His valour has not won out 
over something else in him, but defeated itself and 
perhaps, paradoxically, its self-interfering qual-
ity. Cleopatra seems to agree: «So it should be, 
that none but Antony / Should conquer Antony» 
(17-18), while, in his last words, Antony asks to 
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be remembered in his heyday and repeats that he 
is «a Roman by a Roman / Valiantly vanquished» 
(59-60). He refers to an inner drama, not the 
struggle with Octavius, but the ambiguity is trou-
bling. Roman «valiancy», pertaining to both win-
ner and loser, wins out, resolving agon into ideal 
– as if Antony has finally coincided with his pos-
tulated (non-)self. The replaceability of individu-
als, individuals only in terms of their free acquies-
cence in that fate, is affirmed. Yet this logic of self-
domination is both reclaimed and exposed. These 
phrases are surely aerated by all that has preceded 
them, and dying for love is what he is still doing. 
The «Roman by a Roman» logic echoes the disso-
lution of «water in water», aligning the schematic, 
rationalized self with nominalist indeterminacy 
again, to complex effect.
The drawn-out dying keeps open a space that 
all the talk of split Romans and Antonies tries 
to close. The logical torsion, the self-conscious 
insistence, the repetition of the reflexive motif: 
all bespeak the sacrifice of, and for, something 
valuable, something validated through this death, 
but no longer according to the scheme in which 
only the inessential dies, like a failing body. The 
phrases betray a resistance to monadic Roman-
ness. Cleopatra is axial here. She is not, in fact, 
overlooked: Antony appeals to her memory, her 
perception, and lays a claim on it, which he takes 
as their claim. This deeper demand animates this 
odd re-assertion of Roman honour. Without pow-
er, we know, Antony is but little. But as merely 
power, he was mastered, alienated. 
3. Cleopatra’s is a different sort of singularity. 
Changeable and histrionic, she attracts and resists 
moralizing judgment. She is often admirable, even 
in Roman opinion, but concepts catch up with her 
only as paradox or aporia.
«What manner o’thing is your crocodile?» asks 
Lepidus (2.7.37). Antony offers a mocking reply: 
«It is shaped, sir, like itself, and it is as broad as it 
hath breadth. It is just so high as it is, and moves 
with it[s] own organs. It lives by that which nour-
isheth it, and the elements once out of it, it trans-
migrates» (38-41). The crocodile is closed: fully 
expressed by being fully withheld. The passage 
has rightly been taken to exemplify the otherness 
Egypt represents in the play (as in Klein [2016]). 
But there are distinctions to make. Cleopatra is 
no blank. Keeping Antony guessing is part of her 
conscious tactics (as made clear to Charmian 
[1.3.9-10]). But she is a being where tactics go a 
long way down, and so the screen is also the thing 
itself. Her theatricality is radical.
Antony announces a theme: «Fie, wrangling 
queen, / Whom everything becomes, to chide, 
to laugh, / To weep, whose every passion fully 
strives / To make itself, in thee, fair and admired!» 
(1.1.50-53). Her every passing passion aspires to 
beauty and reverence, like independent agents 
inspired by being in her. The passions, in her, are 
exemplary: idealized universals and unique, trans-
formed, no longer merely themselves. She is not 
the mere bearer of universal predicates, but a phe-
nomenon that completes and elevates them. 
This paradoxical metaphysics comes clearest in 
Enobarbus’ appreciations of the queen. «I saw her 
once», he says, «Hop forty paces through the pub-
lic street, / And having lost her breath, she spoke, 
and panted, / That she did make defect perfection 
/ And, breathless, power breathe forth» (2.2.238-
242). Again, whatever she does is perfect, because 
she does it. If the report does not escape misogy-
nist framing – her «power» is a suspect charm 
– a living body is still celebrated. This is even a 
love-vision of sorts. Enobarbus can explain why 
Antony will never leave Cleopatra:
Age cannot wither her, nor custom stale
Her infinite variety. Other women cloy
The appetites they feed, but she makes hungry 
Where most she satisfies. For vilest things
Become themselves in her, that the holy priests
Bless her when she is riggish. (2.2.245-251)
Here, perhaps, the male desire to possess and 
discard is exacerbated and thwarted. But a pecu-
liar tension appears as «vilest things / Become 
themselves in her». This explicates the prior para-
dox about desire and satisfaction. Satiety is not 
(self-)disgust; desire persists in its fulfilment. The 
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ascetic idea that perception of true moral ugli-
ness is endlessly deflected is there. But also this: 
the worst becomes decorous, beautiful. It reaches 
full expression, even as its quality is changed; the 
point about the priests asserts sexual allure as 
supreme value. Cleopatra’s presentation of evils is 
itself good, as if she were a representation of them: 
she is «a wonderful piece of work» (1.2.148). Yet 
she is also the thing itself, redeeming, not stilling, 
the passions she inflames.
In Roman logic, a blemish is a blemish (cf. 
1.4.21-23). But Cleopatra’s affective and somatic 
expressions are retrieved from familiar taboos. 
Love trumps law. Contrast Agrippa’s praise of 
Octavia, «[w]hose virtue and whose general graces 
speak / That which none else can utter» (2.2.138-
139). Octavia’s virtues are «general», her unique-
ness and ineffability consisting in her proximity to 
the form of virtue. She is statuesque: «She shows 
a body rather than a life, / A statue than a breath-
er» (3.3.19-21), according to the messenger (who 
tells Cleopatra what she wants to hear). Octavia, 
«a piece of virtue» (3.2.28), lays no claim of her 
own. Cleopatra is no such statue. Nor is she pure 
crocodilian otherness. What is singular about her 
is also something reproducible, or animating of 
other relationships. To see her is to see something 
of what the lovers see in each other. She can trans-
form the beholder.
4. These figurations resist not only Octavius’ 
dogmatic conceptual «realism» but also the con-
cept that thinks it owes nothing to its objects and 
experiential situation. Nominalism, qua the insist-
ence on indeterminate givenness, is domination’s 
alibi and twin13. It serves up «unqualitied» mate-
rial to knock into shape. Just as Cleopatra is other, 
but not absolutely so, the play explores how the 
push-back against this model can be experienced, 
made dramatically available. 
Singularity is linked to performance and 
re-performance. It finds its life in the kinds of 
13 The terminus of nominalism is inarticulate point-
ing: «there, there» (Adorno [1958]: 206), as was clear to 
some early modern thinkers (see Popkin [2003]: 40-41).
reports, desires and actions it inspires. Cleopatra’s 
comment about her «becomings» (transforma-
tions, charms) «kill[ing]» her «when they do not 
/ Eye well to [Antony]» is important (1.3.97-98). 
The striking functional shifts (becoming as noun, 
eye as verb), imply that the perceptual relation-
ship is intricate and two-way (cf. Kermode [2000]: 
219). But the main sense is of qualities turning 
bad unless the lover appreciates them. Antony’s 
challenge to the world for acknowledgement, and 
his fantasy of drawing crowds in heaven (4.14), 
also appeals to an audience. Their «peerlessness» 
will consist, however, in its transformation of such 
relationships, despite any narcissistic craving for 
spectators. Antony’s and Cleopatra’s qualities are 
accessible through each other and must become 
communicable to others. Their love is generaliz-
able to all insofar as it is possibly inclusive of all. 
There are layers of substitution and transference 
both within and beyond their relationship.
This «theatricality» reveals what gets air-
brushed out of the rigid Octavian sort. Events cor-
rect your judgement or action, lay bare what they 
mean (see Speight [2001]). The lessons typically 
involve the opening up of a human connection 
where it had been denied or misunderstood. A 
small example occurs when Antony catches him-
self mourning Fulvia, whom he has wished dead 
(1.2.119-124). He does not want her back, and 
the moment is perhaps even «conditional upon 
absence», as Dollimore says ([1984]: 207). But this 
is not hypocrisy. Antony learns what this death 
means. In this play, after all, there is freedom to 
change sides and regret the change. The logic 
speaks in the steady clarification of what the lov-
ers’ love entails. 
Compare how Roman agency is distributed 
through patterns of mistrust and emulation. Sub-
ordinates threaten their superiors through their 
very success in executing orders (as Ventidius 
knows: 3.1). Pompey wishes Menas had assas-
sinated his rivals before consulting him, for now 
honour dictates that he veto the plan (2.7). This is 
a clue to how the Stoic, abstractive individual con-
nives with the power to choose the actions one 
is associated with, irrespective of what one does. 
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Likewise, Cleopatra’s impotence is manifested by 
her futile attempt to shift blame for her dishon-
est accountancy onto Seleucus: «We answer oth-
ers’ merits in our name» (5.2.177). Deniability 
depends on the proxy, who also threatens it.
The play anatomizes all this, and the lovers 
will come to defend the individual through rela-
tions other than those of competitive survival with 
which they are entangled. Love expands individual 
interests – rather than reinforcing them, or self-
sacrificingly overriding them (the Roman alterna-
tives). That point is reached, however, only after 
a near-total breakdown in the face of doubts and 
other motives. The lovers are despairing, competi-
tive, jealous and, in Cleopatra’s case, capable of 
manipulation to the point of playing dead. That 
pretence, nevertheless, and Antony’s protracted 
death, allow them to defuse mistrust by both 
«dying» first: Antony realizes what is worth dying 
for; Cleopatra gets the best proof she can of his 
love. Even so, she will not leave her monument to 
be with Antony (4.15). And after he is gone, she 
still weighs the options. Clearly, this is not Romeo 
and Juliet. The lovers nonetheless stumble towards 
something beyond domination. This freedom is 
paradoxically indicated through their recasting of 
available dominating models and representation.
Cleopatra’s theatrics are often nettling for this 
reason. «Sir, you and I must part, but that’s not 
it; / Sir, you and I have loved, but there’s not it; 
/ That you know well. Something it is I would – 
/ O, my oblivion is a very  Antony, / And I am 
all forgotten» (1.3.88-92). «Antony» is used as a 
byword for forgetfulness – his forgetting her – 
and she pretends that she cannot bring out what 
she wants to say. Antony’s exasperated response 
is revealing: «But that your royalty / Holds idle-
ness your subject, I should take you / For idle-
ness itself» (92-94). She is not quite a personifi-
cation of an essence; she uses frivolity as she uses 
him and she should stop. But she objects: «’Tis 
sweating labour / To bear such idleness so near 
the heart / As Cleopatra this» (94-96). She talks 
in the third person not because she is her own 
puppet but to insist on her candour and coher-
ency. Her so-called idleness either expresses 
pains as extreme as those of the child-bed, or is a 
nerve-wracking effort to shield them from view. 
It is not playing.
Antony’s and Cleopatra’s love is not necessar-
ily totally unique, let alone ideal; nor, on the other 
hand, is it just another relationship like those they 
have known before. That idea cannot be absolutely 
ruled out – witness Cleopatra’s violent reaction to 
Charmian’s baiting about Julius Caesar (1.5.70-
74)14. And the language the lovers attract stresses 
love’s substitutive character. This, precisely, is its 
exemplary aspect. Cleopatra can see Antonies 
all about her, and everything in him. She consid-
ers catching fish: «as I draw them up / I’ll think 
them every one an Antony / And say, “Aha! You’re 
caught”» (2.5.13-15). Such play connects to the 
lovers’ role-playing and cross-dressing (22-23). 
As David Hillman points out, «love-as-an-emo-
tion and love-as-a-performance [are] inextricable 
from one another» (Hillman [2013]: 330). What is 
loved, it seems, is something re-distributable, even 
ludic, not some unshareable core. 
Specific, singular worth might seem only the 
property of report, a function of absence (Harris 
[1994]; cf. Hillman [2013]: 308). Yet this does not 
mean that love is only projection, that its substi-
tutions owe nothing to its objects. In this light, 
the play’s hyperbole is not always ridiculous, 
despite the cynicism besieging it (as with the sol-
diers’ pointed mockery of Lepidus’ language in 
3.2). While it is tangled in self-assertion, it is an 
emphasis expressing the lover as such. It demands 
that something be recognized.
The lovers’ values transmit to those on whom 
their relationship depends, as can be seen in Eno-
barbus’ and Charmian’s deaths. A more projective 
phenomenon is figured, negatively, in the jeal-
ous aggression shown toward messengers. Things 
start promisingly: Cleopatra thinks the first mes-
senger is «gilded» by association with Antony 
(1.5.39), and the messenger who brings news 
about Antony’s remarriage is first greeted in sex-
ual terms: «O, from Italy! / Ram thou thy fruitful 
14 The replaceability and treachery of husbands and 
wives is a theme (and source of raillery, as in 1.2).
178 Nigel Mapp
tidings in mine ears, / That long time have been 
barren» (2.5.23-25). On hearing about Octavia, 
Cleopatra repeats the transference, only this time 
negatively: «Hadst thou Narcissus in thy face, to 
me / Thou wouldst appear most ugly» (98-99). 
Her physical abuse of this man, too, seems like a 
terrible compliment. As in Antony’s treatment of 
Thidias, we see self-command and social hierarchy 
crumbling. But that this jealousy can so inform 
the world is a striking, inverse figure of the trust, 
the social and somatic fulfilment, that love prom-
ises. Their insecurities, the world against which 
they must kick, clarify the ideal.
When, before the final defeat, Antony is 
thanking his followers, he envisages a relation-
ship unlike Roman hierarchy: «I wish I could be 
made so many men, / And all of you clapped up 
together in / An Antony, that I might do you ser-
vice / So good as you have done». The novelty of 
the conceit is indicated in their reply: «The gods 
forbid!» (4.2.17-20). There is self-regard – Antony 
splits into a team of servants to himself. But this 
Antony is the epitome of these men; not exactly 
himself, but what they share, their noblest part 
(cf. 4.8.5-7). He acknowledges the relations on 
which Roman honour depends, and redefines it, 
albeit from the vantage point of impossibility, a 
wish. This is no mere image of disposable, indif-
ferent persons, as is risked in his final words (dis-
cussed above); the name and value of «Antony» is 
reclaimed even as it is shared. 
His death has a different levelling effect for 
Cleopatra. «Young boys and girls / Are level now 
with men; the odds is gone, / And there is noth-
ing left remarkable / Beneath the visiting moon» 
(4.15.67-70). Differences of rank or worth, gender 
and generation, perhaps any meaningful distinc-
tion, are gone. Yet Cleopatra modulates this nomi-
nalist nihilism. She rejects the titles with which 
Iras addresses her: «No more but e’en a woman, 
and commanded / By such poor passion as the 
maid that milks / And does the meanest chares» 
(4.15.78-80). She feels solidarity and she then 
takes notable care to comfort her women (87-90). 
The comfort is suicide: «Let’s do’t after the high 
Roman fashion» (92). Like Antony, she asserts a 
Roman value. Yet it is also freely adopted, adapted. 
As for Antony, the forced Stoic position combines 
with the desire to unite with, or at least affirm, 
what has been lost. She has «immortal longings» 
(5.2.275) – a desire for immortal remembrance of 
their love, perhaps, whatever happens to her (cf. 
Garrison [2019]: 66).
5. Thinking Cleopatra dead, Antony pictures 
the afterlife for which he is impatient: «Where 
souls do couch on flowers, we’ll hand in hand, / 
And with our sprightly port make the ghosts gaze. 
/ Dido and her Aeneas shall want troops, / And all 
the haunt be ours» (4.14.51-54). Aeneas cast Dido 
away in favour of his political destiny, but here the 
lovers are back together. Dido gets «her» Aeneas – 
her man, now true to himself. Antony, careless of 
whether Rome was founded or not, mends their 
relationship. But he and Cleopatra will transcend 
it. In the Elysian theatre, they will be the main 
attraction, albeit one otherwise undescribed here.
Cleopatra has no comparable vision of the 
afterlife. Nonetheless, she too re-envisions avail-
able patterns. Her theatricalizing of the dead 
Antony and of her suicide distances itself from the 
worldly values it reclaims.
Cleopatra’s suicide blocks Octavius’ plan 
for her live exhibition in Rome. She particu-
larly dreads seeing herself parodied: «I shall see 
/ Some squeaking Cleopatra boy my greatness / 
I’th’posture of a whore» (5.2.218-220). She heads 
off this humiliation. But can she control her future 
representation? The anxiety is exacerbated by the 
audacious self-reference that points to the youth 
playing the queen. But the moment simultane-
ously reveals that this (Shakespearean) theatre is 
not exactly the one Cleopatra fears. It deepens 
and ironizes her fear of the deletion of her worth, 
rather than actually deleting it. It even makes her, 
suddenly, as real as this actor – this one, who is 
not her. Indicating dramatic illusion does not 
leave nothing. Nor does theatre fail its subject if 
it cannot perfectly recreate it. Instead, its subject’s 
pressures and possibilities are felt in their re-figu-
ration. Cleopatra stands for a theatre, a memory, 
distinct from obliteration.
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Her love vision clarifies this. It is like a vision 
of worldly sovereignty and proposes a different 
future through a picture of the past. It is not solil-
oquy, but addresses Dolabella, with a challenge:
I dreamt there was an emperor Antony.
O, such another sleep, that I might see
But such another man! […]
His face was as the heav’ns, and therein stuck
A sun and moon, which kept their course and lighted
The little O, the earth. […]
His legs bestrid the ocean; his reared arm
Crested the world; his voice was propertied
As all the tunèd spheres, and that to friends;
But when he meant to quail and shake the orb,
He was as rattling thunder. For his bounty,
There was no winter in’t; an autumn ’twas
That grew the more by reaping. His delights
Were dolphin-like; they showed his back above
The element they lived in. In his livery
Walked crowns and crownets; realms and islands 
were
As plates dropped from his pocket. […]
Think you there was or might be such a man
As this I dreamt of? (5.2.75-93)
Cleopatra’s imagination is a complex optic. 
Perhaps it tells of a literal dream; perhaps of the 
dream that her past now is. The past tense feels 
ambivalent, too: this is her dream of how Antony 
was; this is Antony as he appeared in her dream. 
The question whether «there was or might be 
such a man» implies the dual perspective. Is this 
the Antony that was destroyed by love, or the one 
realized in it? Is he an open fiction?
The speech is a stunning inflation of Roman 
hyperbole: a colossus, but one that is alive, a phe-
nomenon of beneficent nature, part of the cosmic 
framework as much as imperial imposition. He is 
more than ever a body, one sustaining passion-
ate friendships and elemental anger. Cleopatra 
is blending in the terms of her earlier praise of 
Antony: «O heavenly mingle! Be’st thou sad or 
merry, / The violence of either thee becomes, / 
So does it no man else» (1.5.62-64). Antony here 
redeems passion as attractive rather than aversive, 
just as she is said to do in the reports she inspires. 
No figure of pared-down self-command, in the 
dream he grows by reaping, being reaped, a figure 
with both social and natural significance: he is as 
carelessly magnanimous as he is life-generating. 
Cleopatra’s passion retrieves passion as grandeur. 
She asserts a «dolphin-like» Antony, immersed in 
but never lost to the waters, his delights.
Dolabella replies with measured realism to the 
question whether «there was or might be such a 
man»: «Gentle madam, no» (5.2.93). He is fiercely 
rebuked. Cleopatra goes on: «But if there be nor 
ever were one such, / It’s past the size of dreaming. 
Nature wants stuff / To vie strange forms with fan-
cy; yet t’imagine / An Antony were Nature’s piece 
against fancy, / Condemning shadows quite» (94-
99). She defends the dream, even if this individual 
does not exist and never has existed. The phrasing 
is compressed. One sense is that the non-existence 
cannot even be imagined. The chief sense is that if 
there never were such a person, then he could not 
be imagined. Or: if there were never such a man, 
he is nevertheless beyond any dream. Something 
in reality, actual or potential, informs the image. 
Nature generally lacks the material to compete 
with fancy’s productions, she says, but this fan-
tastic Antony does not take rise in the fancy. To 
«imagine / An Antony» is to channel a nature with 
which fancy cannot compete, exposing it as fan-
cy. Antony is this «piece» – a paragon, type, and 
person (Crystal, Crystal [2002]: 327). (Note the 
worldly appeal to «size», as if increase in dimen-
sion, rather than something less tangible, captures 
a vital, immeasurable, transformation of quality.) 
The element that inspires and is inspired by love 
is real. This is even a mimesis of what does not yet 
exist, a possibility attested by what has been, when 
taken in the light which it, in turn, has made pos-
sible (see Junker [2015]: 184).
This imagination is a conceiving power know-
ingly drawing on a nature it has known, as it has 
known it. Cleopatra says «An Antony» partly 
to stress her redemptive powers, partly to indi-
cate the idea’s ground in what it preserves and 
transfigures. She assembles him – as she pieced 
his armour together earlier (4.4.7) – making of 
Antony a kind. The reality of this love is again tied 
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both to the beloved and to potential transfer to a 
re-imagined, rather than dominated, world (cf. 
Hillman [2013]: 311, 332).
Cleopatra’s rationale recalls Enobarbus’ ear-
lier description of her: «O’erpicturing that Venus 
where we see / The fancy outwork nature» 
(2.2.210-211). She improves on the fancy which, 
through representations of Venus, improves on 
nature. But she «o’erpictures» such a Venus, dou-
bles the artistry, because she is the real thing, and 
the work of fancy can now be «seen» for what it 
is (positively and negatively). Cleopatra both ousts 
Venus, and presents her, what she represents or 
instantiates, more closely.
Cleopatra’s death replays this scene Enobar-
bus was speaking of: «I am again for Cydnus, / 
To meet Mark Antony» (5.2.227-228). She dress-
es for the part. To this role is added an appar-
ently antithetical one: «Now from head to foot / I 
am marble-constant; now the fleeting moon / No 
planet is of mine» (238-240). She must steady her-
self for the «noble act» (279). This combination of 
values speaks again when Cleopatra identifies the 
pleasure to come with death itself: «The stroke 
of death is as a lover’s pinch» (289). As Junker 
notes ([2015]: 180), this is no mere replica of the 
past, for she insists on a union she never enjoyed 
before: «Husband, I come! / Now to that name my 
courage prove my title» (5.2.281-282). The per-
formance, right now, is «the repetition, or retriev-
al, of her past into a present that changes and is 
changed by it» (Junker [2015]: 181). His merit 
inspires hers and, as for Antony at the last, death 
is less the route to fulfilment than fulfilment itself.
Illusion or no, this sets high terms for any rec-
onciliation with death, which are equally terms for 
reconciliation with the world. This Liebestod con-
victs ascetic life of deathliness. And the terms set 
are not a reconciliation with domination, but with 
the environing, affective nature that speaks in her 
vision of Antony and her fervent dying. As love, as 
mourning, this suicide asserts the hope of a differ-
ent history.
6. There are moments in Antony and Cleopatra 
where some action is signalled through the bare 
word «thus», as when Antony apparently kisses 
Cleopatra (1.1.39) or embraces Octavius (2.2.29), 
or when Eros imitates Antony’s gait (3.5.14). 
Something is emphasized, but what it is needs to 
be inferred. The particular demonstrations, ges-
tural quiddities, are wordless but they are also 
iterable, and of course they can be highly conven-
tionalized. They are a clue to how claims against 
Roman processing elude decisive capture or literal 
exposition but are sustained in expressive indices, 
whether tiny nuances or hyperbolic rapture.
This is where Adorno’s ban on images of uto-
pia, for the sake of utopia, feels relevant. Compare 
his comment on Romeo and Juliet:
The immanence of artworks, their apparently a priori 
distance from the empirical, would not exist without 
the prospect of a world transformed by self-conscious 
praxis. In Romeo and Juliet Shakespeare was not pro-
moting love without familial guardianship; but with-
out the longing for a situation in which love would no 
longer be mutilated and condemned by patriarchal or 
any other powers, the presence of the two lost in one 
another would not have the sweetness – the wordless, 
imageless utopia – over which, to this day, the cen-
turies have been powerless; the taboo that prohibits 
knowledge of any positive utopia also reigns over art-
works. (Adorno [1970a]: 366-367; [1970b]: 247)15
From the start, Antony thinks his love apoca-
lyptic. It requires a «new heaven, new earth» 
(1.1.17; cf. Revelation 21.1). Hyperbole is truth: 
bliss is wordless, even a mere thus, because it is 
as yet worldless. Likewise, Cleopatra’s theatre lives 
chiefly in virtue of its emphases. It can seem that 
only the poetry saves the lovers from ridiculous-
ness (cf. Kermode [2000]: 230). Yet the extraordi-
nary elevations nonetheless index a critical yearn-
ing, and a demand – one borne particularly in its 
affective and articulatory intensities. These chal-
lenge the allegedly critical attitudes that work by 
suspicion, discrediting them (cf. Felski [2015]).
What, then, of the play’s aesthetic character? 
«For 25 years», says Brian Cummings,
15 On the complexities of Adorno’s image ban, see, for 
example, Pritchard (2002).
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Shakespearean theatre has been imagined in relation 
to Stephen Greenblatt’s idea, developed most formally 
in Shakespearean Negotiations (1988), that the thea-
tre after the Reformation, like religious belief itself, is 
a place of mimesis and not sacrament. Shakespeare’s 
theatre is the desacralized ritual shell of dramatic 
illusion left over once the kernel of belief is removed. 
(Cummings [2012]: 372)
The autonomization of art from religion and 
indeed rational authority is underway in the early 
modern theatre. If drama (compulsorily) enjoys 
a relative freedom of self-determination it is also 
now restricted to a disenchanted, «emptied out», 
sphere (see Greenblatt [1988]: 119). It is severed 
from the ritual or liturgical calendar and its civic 
and moralizing uses and established as a largely 
commercial enterprise (O’Connell [2000]). In fact, 
it is now in competition with sermons and the 
newly disenchanted rituals of the church, as Cum-
mings suggests. It has a considerable degree of 
formal freedom, despite censorship and the gen-
eral hostility of the City authorities. In this new 
space, spectators are freed from communal iden-
tifications with didactic personifications – fixed 
character concepts and structures of identification 
– and able, if they so wish, to judge both plays and 
characters for themselves, along with any such 
re-worked «morality play» components (cf. Shell 
[2010]: 121-122). They are free because they have 
had to pay to enter the theatre; the new London 
playhouses are all interior spaces, «walled off from 
the outside world» (Preiss [2013]: 50-51). A rhe-
torical education in presenting both sides of a 
debate – argumentum in ultramque partem – fur-
ther informs these playwrights’ off-shore, sceptical 
and querying, rather than didactic mode. (Rome 
or Egypt?) Plays now innovate in subject-matter, 
in genre and manipulation of conventions, and 
freely argue, through ironic allusion or coat-trail-
ing peritexts, with other plays and playwrights, 
their practice and norms, from the stage. 
The theatre is no longer the adjunct of inclu-
sive and authoritative social rituals and mean-
ings. But Cummings is right to proceed, as he 
does, to question any straightforward separation 
of ritual participation from the spectatorship of 
the theatre. One reason is that a broader theat-
ricality is under «rational» siege in this culture, 
as scepticism eats into appearances, and agency 
becomes almost structurally suspicious, estranged 
from its expressions and its passionate life. This 
affects the relation of these plays to their materi-
als. In the case of Antony and Cleopatra, and like 
the sequestered Cleopatra herself, there seems to 
be an insistence on disposing over its sources, the 
mythic and generic givens and conventions. The 
play even risks comedy at sensitive points, such as 
the winching up of the dying Antony (4.15), and 
metatheatrical reference. It seems ironic that it is 
such a self-determining, stipulative artistic power 
that affords the play its arraignment of the sup-
pressive theatre of Octavius. That result, however, 
comes equally of immersion in and expression of 
its medium and materials, in the social experience 
that lies congealed or sedimented in them but 
which breathes in their specific re-configuration 
here; for they are of course not raw materials at 
all. They at least bear the scars of their iconoclas-
tic or sceptical emptying. In experiencing them 
as such, the play itself is an image, or promise, 
of reconciled freedom. This aesthetic immersion 
relies on the reflective, distancing power. 
Adorno’s full sentence on Shakespeare’s nomi-
nalism can now be quoted:
Shakespeare’s nominalistic breakthrough into mortal 
and infinitely rich individuality – as content – is as 
much a function of an antitectonic, quasi-epic succes-
sion of short scenes as this episodic technique is under 
the control of content: a metaphysical experience that 
explodes the meaning-giving order of the old unities. 
([1970a]: 317; [1970b]: 213)
Nominalism manifests technically as discon-
tinuous structure. Relationships of causality, time, 
and space are radically discomposed16. Scope and 
mood are fluid. Antony and Cleopatra’s geographi-
16 This drastically simplifies Adorno’s explorations 
of nominalism, genre, and art. See especially the section 
on universal and particular in Aesthetic Theory (Adorno 
[1970b]: 199-225).
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cal reach and 42 scenes would seem to exemplify 
this point that coordination by the «old unities», 
and genres, is suspect. There is no single size and 
shape for notable actions, still less a stable third-
person perspective from which to consider (or 
identify with) them. Distinct, yet interpenetrating 
and differentiated, worlds confront each other and 
themselves. A wealth of characters, whose media-
tions are many and far-flung, is presented. Messen-
gers do not pool all relevant knowledge before us 
but signify absence, obtruding themselves as stand-
ins. Adorno insists, then, that this dramatic tech-
nique is crucial in elaborating the irreducible vari-
ety and nuance of character – and that the tech-
nique itself shares in this idiosyncratic, subjective 
quality. Antony and Cleopatra – through its formal 
freedom – imitates, and suffers under, a disloca-
tion of agency and significance, just as much as it 
articulates it. Only in this aesthetic character can it 
express and underline critical possibilities.
This is partly a drama of unfolding opinions, 
categories and norms. It displays their inadequacy 
or modification to context. Antony will not fit the 
conceptual grid, whatever violence he offers him-
self. Cleopatra, more clearly still, remains a «knot 
intrinsicate» (5.2.298) in perceptions of her. And 
their love is never fully taken up into portably dis-
cursive significance or shared recognition; the pos-
sibility the lovers die for is available mainly in its 
antagonism with stultifying norms of self-determi-
nation. Antony’s dying and, especially, Cleopatra’s 
image of redeemed life, ironize, intensify, and 
refuse what they protest against17. Hence Adorno’s 
resonant oxymoron: «metaphysical experience».
The lovers’ compelled relinquishment is defin-
ing of a form of rationality. Torn free of the law, 
the past, from role, they are left, however, with 
more than dumb facticity or fantasy. Reconcilia-
tion means redemption from marmoreal, imperial 
17 This re-reads the subjective opacity that Hegel saw 
in Shakespeare. According to Adorno, the «individual 
and passion» are sites of social antagonism in Antony and 
Cleopatra, whose central passion is «disgust for power» 
([1970a]: 378; [1970b]: 254-255). Antony’s surviving on 
foul sustenance, so praised by Caesar, can thus emblema-
tize revulsion for power, for ascesis itself.
form, not sheer difference from it, and if its imagi-
nation is gagged and helpless, it is an indictment 
of history. The love-work taken up by Cleopatra 
is not pure creation, or sheer counterfactual. It is, 
the play wants us to know, the height of artifice, 
against artifice.
REFERENCES
Adelman, J., 1973: The Common Liar: An Essay on 
«Antony and Cleopatra», Yale University Press, 
New Haven.
Adorno, T.W., 1951: Minima Moralia: Reflections 
on a Damaged Life, transl. by E. F. N. Jephcott, 
New Left Books, London-New York, 1974.
Adorno, T.W., 1958: An Introduction to Dialec-
tics (1958), ed. by C. Ziermann, transl. by N. 
Walker, Polity Press, Cambridge-Malden, 2017.
Adorno, T.W., 1970a: Ästhetische Theorie, ed. by G. 
Adorno and R. Tiedemann, Suhrkamp, Frank-
furt.
Adorno, T.W., 1970b: Aesthetic Theory, transl. 
by R. Hullot-Kentor, Athlone Press, London, 
1997.
Benjamin, W., 1925: Origin of the German Trauer-
spiel, transl. by H. Eiland, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge-London, 2019.
Bernstein, J.M., 1992: The Fate of Art: Aesthetic 
Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno, 
Polity Press, Cambridge.
Blumenberg, H., 1966: The Legitimacy of the Mod-
ern Age, transl. by R.M. Wallace, MIT Press, 
Massachusetts, 1983.
Bull, M., 2006: The Mirror of the Gods: Classical 
Mythology in Renaissance Art, Penguin, Lon-
don-New York.
Cavell, S., 2003: Disowning Knowledge in Seven 
Plays of Shakespeare, updated edition, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge-New York.
Crawford, J., 2017: Allegory and Enchantment: An 
Early Modern Poetics, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford.
Crystal, D., Crystal, B., 2002: Shakespeare’s Words: 
A Glossary and Language Companion, Pen-
guin, New York-London.
183Early Modern Aesthetics: Antony and Cleopatra and the Afterlife of Domination
Cummings, B., 2012: «Dead March»: Liturgy and 
Mimesis in Shakespeare’s Funerals, “Shake-
speare” 8 (4), pp. 368-385.
Cummings, B., 2013: Mortal Thoughts: Religion, 
Secularity & Identity in Shakespeare and Ear-
ly Modern Culture, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford.
Das, N., Davis, N. (eds.), 2017: Enchantment and 
Disenchantment in Shakespeare and Early Mod-
ern Drama, Routledge, New York-Abingdon.
Dollimore, J., 1984: «Antony and Cleopatra» (c. 
1607): «Virtus» under Erasure, in Radical Trag-
edy, third edition, Duke University Press, Dur-
ham, 2004, pp. 206-217.
Felski, R., 2015: The Limits of Critique, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago-London.
Funkenstein, A., 1986: Theology and the Scientific 
Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Sev-
enteenth Century. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton-Chichester.
Garrison, J.S., 2018: Shakespeare and the Afterlife, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Gauchet, M., 1985: The Disenchantment of the World: 
A Political History of Religion, transl. by O. Burge, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997.
Gaukroger, S., 2006: The Emergence of a Scientific 
Culture: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 
1210-1685, Clarendon Press, Oxford-New York.
Gillespie, M.A., 2009: The Theological Origins of 
Modernity, Chicago University Press, Chicago-
London.
Grady, H., 2009: Shakespeare and Impure Aesthet-
ics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge-
New York.
Grady, H., 2013: Reification, Mourning, and the 
Aesthetic in «Antony and Cleopatra» and «The 
Winter’s Tale», in C. DiPietro, H. Grady (eds.), 
Shakespeare and the Urgency of Now: Criticism 
and Theory in the 21st Century, Palgrave Mac-
millan, Basingstoke-New York, pp. 172-187.
Greenblatt, S., 1988: Shakespearean Negotiations: 
The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance 
England, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Hamlin, W.M., 2005: Tragedy and Scepticism in 
Shakespeare’s England, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Houndmills-New York.
Hammermeister, K., 2002: The German Aesthetic 
Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge-New York.
Harris, J.G., 1994: «Narcissus in thy face»: Roman 
Desire and the Difference It Fakes in «Antony 
and Cleopatra», “Shakespeare Quarterly” 45(4), 
pp. 408-425.
Hillman, D., 2013: «If it be love indeed»: Trans-
ference, Love, and «Anthony and Cleopatra», 
“Shakespeare Quarterly” 64(3), pp. 301-333.
Horkheimer, M., Adorno, T.W., 1944: Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, transl. by E. Jephcott, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 2002.
Jarvis, S., 2001: «Old Idolatry»: Rethinking Ideology 
and Materialism, in M. Rossington, A. White-
head (eds.), Between the Psyche and the Polis: 
Refiguring History in Literature and Theory, 
Ashgate, Aldershot, pp. 21-37.
Junker, W., 2015: The Image of Both Theaters: 
Empire and Revelation in Shakespeare’s «Antony 
and Cleopatra», “Shakespeare Quarterly” 66(2), 
pp. 167-187.
Kermode, F., 2000: Shakespeare’s Language, Allen 
Lane, London.
Klein, B., 2016: Antony and Cleopatra, in M. Neill, 
D. Schalkwyk (eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Shakespearean Tragedy, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford-New York, pp. 452-467.
Mapp, N., 2013: «Dead Life: George Herbert versus 
Modern Self-Surrender», “Philologie im Netz” 
65, pp. 37-79.
Mapp, N., 2021: «Macbeth» and Mortal Disen-
chantment, forthcoming.
McGrath, P.J., 2020: Early Modern Asceticism: 
Literature, Religion, and Austerity in the Eng-
lish Renaissance, University of Toronto Press, 
Toronto-Buffalo-London.
O’Connell, M., 2000: The Idolatrous Eye: Icono-
clasm and Theater in Early-Modern England, 
Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford.
Oppitz-Trotman, G., 2016: Adorno’s «Hamlet», 
“New German Critique” 43(3), pp. 175-201.
Pfau, T., 2013: Minding the Modern: Human Agen-
cy, Intellectual Traditions, and Responsible 
Knowledge, University of Notre Dame Press, 
Notre Dame.
184 Nigel Mapp
Pollard, T. (ed.), 2004: Shakespeare’s Theater: A 
Sourcebook, Blackwell, Malden-Oxford.
Popkin, R.H., 2003: The History of Scepticism: 
From Savonarola to Bayle, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford-New York. 
Preiss, R., 2013: Interiority, in H.S. Turner (ed.), 
Early Modern Theatricality, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, pp. 47-70.
Pritchard, E.A., 2002: «Bilderverbot» Meets Body 
in Theodor Adorno’s Inverse Theology, “Harvard 
Theological Review” 95(3), pp. 291-318.
Shakespeare, W., 1606: Antony and Cleopatra, ed. 
by D. Bevington, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge-New York, 2005.
Shell, A., 2010: Shakespeare and Religion, Blooms-
bury, London-New York.
Siedentop, L., 2015: Inventing the Individual: The 
Origins of Western Liberalism, Penguin, Lon-
don.
Speight, A., 2001: Hegel, Literature and the Prob-
lem of Agency, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge-New York.
Taylor, C., 2007: A Secular Age, Belknap/Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge-London.
Walsham, A., 1999: Providence in Early Modern 
England, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New 
York.
Weber, M., 1905: The Protestant Ethic and the 
«Spirit» of Capitalism and Other Writings, 
transl. by P. Baehr and G.C. Wells, Penguin, 
London-New York, 2002.
